Hey guys! I’m considering using a VPN and found out about NymVPN. What is your experience with it?

  • It_is_gaslighting@discuss.tchncs.de
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    20 days ago

    The tech and the goal of the tech is of increasing importance IMHO. It is cheap. It seems to work as intended. I hope it gets more widespread adoption and growth as I notice big tech has become even more violently invasive using the AI usage data of their customers.

    But if the client device/phone is not secure enough against invasive taking into possession of everything you do like Apple/Alphabet/Huawei etc. backdoored OSs then I would start with that. GrapheneOS for example.

    • TrollAccount69@lemmy.ml
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      20 days ago

      As a daily user of both graphene and ios I’m interested to see evidence of a backdoor in ios.

      • irotsoma@piefed.blahaj.zone
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        17 days ago

        From the top result of searching online, but it’s just one of many you can find easily enough: https://pwn-all.com/blog/2026/07/28/iphone-telemetry-in-2026-what-apple-knows-about-you.html

        And that doesn’t cover the data that gets processed and stored by servers rather than on device. Just like Google and most others, Apple holds all the encryption keys for the data at rest for “convenience”. And this includes app backup data which would include encryption keys for any true end-tp-end encrypted services if you choose to backup that data to your account. Not going to speculate on whether or not they regularly use or sell that data, but they definitely give it to any government agencies or copyright enforcement agencies that properly request it.

        • TrollAccount69@lemmy.ml
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          17 days ago

          There’s a lot in that article but thankfully they put a breakdown at the top saying disabling telemetry only disables what has usually been called telemetry, which is to say crash reports and analytics.

          Not evidence of a backdoor.

          The way to enable e2ee with no chance of unlocking on server side is to enable advanced data protection. It’s not on by default because people get locked out and need access to their stuff. The resolution that makes a cloud customer happy (they get access to the data again) isn’t possible with adp on.

          Apple also famously fought the government in court to avoid giving up user data and the paradigm after that incident is the cat and mouse of intelligence agencies and cutouts like greykey and cellebrite. Ios almost always fares better than everything but graphene in those conditions.

          Regardless things like periodic restarts and knowing the panic combination for rebooting into bfu are important.

          • irotsoma@piefed.blahaj.zone
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            17 days ago

            I guess when you say backdoor you’re implying something nefarious to capture data in motion on the internet. There’s no need to backdoor the encryption of data in motion if you have access to all data at rest on both device and server side for a majority of users. Plus the fact that their services can directly interact with other apps, even commercial apps have some limits. Then combine that with the data they do capture mentioned in this and many other research articles and there’s a lot they can access and compile about you that GrapheneOS users (with default settings) no one can.

            • TrollAccount69@lemmy.ml
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              17 days ago

              I generally think about a backdoor in an os as a way to bypass a device’s lock, not as a backdoor to an encryption process. It’s the same mark of age that caused me to see no problem with the articles statement that turning off telemetry only turned off crash reports and whatnot. That made sense because those are the thing the user turned off and iOS has other controls for the other stuff.

              Which is why I brought up the physical security and bfu points.

              I also don’t know of any examples of Apple giving up customers data that isn’t along the lines of the proton example where the user set their proton recovery email to their firstname.lastname@icloud account and the cops used that to tie datasets together with the phone the user unlocked for them (if memory serves, that was a little bit ago).

              I think people have a severe misconception about the (lack of ) security of Apple devices and tend to look at how a default iphone works as some egregious violation of trust when the vast overwhelming majority of users wouldn’t accept the limitations that being secure on a phone put upon them.

              Ios lockdown mode is a great example. 99% of the time it’s fine but when people try to share contacts you’re shit out of luck and they gotta copy and paste it into a message to you.

              As I said before, I don’t think the majority of people would accept the knowledge that their data is unsoupoenable (sp I’m sure) in exchange for account lockouts or forgotten passwords meaning loss of all cloud data. It’s why adp isn’t the default.

              Was it netbsd who used to brag about no exploits in the default install? And then you actually do a default install and there’s no services and you think “yep, it’s pretty hard to get into a server that’s not running anything”.

              It’s not quite that egregious but graphene is a good relatively secure by default setup while ios is pretty wide open so you can airdrop naked pictures to everyone on the bus and link your location data to your Facebook account, which is honestly what most phone users want. But those gates are closeable and strong in ios.

              I uh also want to point out that the metadata cops use against you is your push notifications and I don’t even know any other in person fellow graphene users who disable those.

              Broadly, having a phone is dangerous and if everyone understood that radio, television and the internet are propaganda and military c&c networks they’d be much less likely to buy the products to use them.

              • irotsoma@piefed.blahaj.zone
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                17 days ago

                OK I see why you call yourself TrollAccount, guess I should have take a hint and not engaged. All of this is so off topic from why using a VPN is not going to be secure on an insecure device or one that the manufacturer can get the keys from the device directly or from a backup of those keys loaded on the Apple or google servers.

                • TrollAccount69@lemmy.ml
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                  17 days ago

                  I’m not trying to troll.

                  Do you have any examples of apple turning keys over to the cops? I’m interested if there’s more than simple correlation attacks like what happened when that persons proton account was subpoenaed and the cops matched their recovery email with the account they already had.

                  I know there’s precedent for that kind of thing where basic account information is given up but no actual “data” is shared.

                  We are way offtopic though I think even if a person is using a wide open default samsung a vpn is protecting them from surveillance via the lawful intercept backdoor in the cell system.

                  E: and I want to be clear, the post I replied to said backdoor to the os and so that’s what piqued my interest. Cloud services are their own fucked up thing.

        • TrollAccount69@lemmy.ml
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          8 days ago

          Not a backdoor.

          Also, a local database the os uses to tie its various functions together is literally how it’s marketed. I havent been able to investigate this because my lemmy time has been dominated by explaining thermodynamics and making personalized shopping recommendations but I imagine this is part of the “apple ai” slider.

          The last little bit of the linked article really gives the lie up. “Your logs are a secret sleep schedule”. Yeah. A graphene phone with even just normal device logs will function the same way.

          Pardon the glib tone but I’m often worried about exhibiting symptoms of paranoid delusions or schizophrenic behavior simply because it’s easy to slide into acting like a tinfoil hatter when you pay attention to computer security but articles like this really help make me feel normal. These sources need to be read with the utmost scrutiny because they can’t even be assed to proofread their ai generated article for consistency and clarity. If I found some terrifying hidden database inside a piece of software and made the decision to release those findings using an llm generated document I’d at least check to make sure it doesn’t say something stupid at the beginning and end.

          • It_is_gaslighting@discuss.tchncs.de
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            3 days ago

            ‘Not a backdoor’ by what definition? Because it depends. Snowden calls it a backdoor.

            Quote the ‘something stupid’ or anything. The way you put zero (based) arguments and zero objectivity in your reply tells solely a picture about your mood and self-esteem.

            Or how to say nothing with everything, but…

            What a waste of time.

            • TrollAccount69@lemmy.ml
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              3 days ago

              Okay, so are you making reference to the dual elliptic curve nsa backdoor? I need to know exactly what you’re claiming Snowden called a backdoor because if you’re talking about that particular thing it’s pretty wildly different in form, execution and presentation than the topic of the article you posted.

              Usually when people talk about Snowden and backdoors they’re talking about that because it’s an incredibly well known thing, so I’m trying to get a little clarification from you instead of making assumptions. I’m gonna go ahead as if you are talking about the most famous Snowden backdoor thing but right here up front is me saying it’s possible you’re talking about something else.

              Anyway, it’s a real pain in the butt to copy and paste from the page you linked because it uses graphs and inline notes so liberally, but towards the end there’s a whole section about how the phones database can tell when you sleep. I’ll paste in a sentence from that section so you can search for it and read what seemed so silly to me:

              Weekday against hour of day - when this person is reachable, and when they are asleep

              So what’s stupid to me about this is how much of a big fat “duh, of course it can do that. Any computer can do that” moment it is. Take a look at your dmesg or journalctl -r if you partake. You’ll see login attempts, authentication, apparmor or selinux messages, network connections and disconnections, device connections and disconnections, cpu state changes and power supply changes.

              If you filter for things like authentication or cpu state changes you can easily put together a picture of when the system is in use or asleep, plugged up or running on battery, actively sending and receiving data or just sitting there plugged into the wall. A long time ago when I was in college we reconstructed a class schedule like that using a semesters worth of log files. And showed that I lied to a professor about a dead aunt when I was actually out drinking.

              If it were a computer that spent its time being carried around in your pocket it stands to reason that it would have all kinds of data that could be tilted, pivoted and twisted to give an accurate picture of how long and when you’re sleeping.

              So when I wrote that that part “gives the lie up” I was referring to how the entire article takes a feature of the os operating as advertised and system logs existing and says “isnt that creepy and scary!”

              And to be honest it was a little spooky to realize that if a computer is truly personal then it’s completely bog standard diagnostic information can tell you things that are deeply revealing… twenty years ago when that was made public in a dang boing boing link.

              Which isn’t to say it’s not worthwhile to inform people that their devices give up more than they directly record. It’s important for people to understand that. What I generally take issue with is the presentation and tone, presenting the fundamental function of a modern smartphone as something that could only be malicious and surreptitious and itself as serious security research that should be treated with the gravity of something less clickbaity.

              The whole thing comes across as an attempt to scare the reader. I hesitate to say they, because the formatting, language used and meandering flow without strong argumentation screams llm, but the text is very clearly meant to alarm. But what are they supposed to be alarmed about? That their computer knows which pictures have which pets in them? That the computer stores and manages that information and offers it to the user? that’s the point.

              The point is that the computer comes with a canned function that disables certain types of messaging and notifications when you’re asleep and if you want will even surface that to people so they know you’re not gonna get to them till morning. The point is that you can type “pictures of Duane” into the search doodad and it’ll bring up all the pictures of your dead cat so you can look through them. It’s in the ads. It’s the product.

              And even if the product as advertised is scary to you it’s telling that youd (I’m going out on a limb here as I stated in the very start of this comment, apologies if I’m in the wrong) compare that to an nsa operation to control and secretly insert weakness into a cryptographic algorithm. Because they’re the exact opposite thing! Literally the exact opposite!

              And I beg your pardon for going in reverse order but one stupid thing I saw in the beginning of the page was the most classico style buried lede ever:

              We stress that this goes beyond the specific Apple personal knowledge graph, but it generally applies to any such personalized ML / assistant systems (Muse, Dot, etc.)

              “Uh, we said you should be scared of what the fruit company knows about you, ~but actually this is true for literally any assistant software or ai thing~ .”

              Come on! It’s obvious clickbait that should be read with a skeptical eye.

              • It_is_gaslighting@discuss.tchncs.de
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                16 hours ago

                Ok, I am sorry for the ad hominem shenanigans from my side. I was frustrated because your post wasn’t specific, not even with one example, and without specifics (a quote, a ref) I end up piling up benefit of the doubt and we talk past each other. So here are mine.

                No, I did not mean Dual EC. You’re right that it’s a completely different thing in form and execution. I meant Snowden’s own definition, from his tweets of 28 Oct 2015. He was answering UK minister Joanna Shields, who had said it’s “not about creating back doors” but about companies giving access “when presented with a warrant”. Snowden replied:

                “A backdoor is a mechanism to provide secret access to otherwise confidential communications. It has nothing to do with warrants.” “The warrant is immaterial. A backdoor that requires a warrant is still a backdoor.”

                a source URL : https://www.kitguru.net/gaming/security-software/jon-martindale/snowden-blasts-british-government-over-contradiction-on-encryption/

                That’s more about secret access to confidential stuff than about weakening crypto. So my point was never “the graph = Dual_EC”. It was: how close does the graph come to Snowden’s interpretation? Frankly: not all the way. Nobody has shown a third party actually querying it, so by his definition it’s not a backdoor. At most it’s the room behind the door, already prepared and even made resilient.

                Regarding these points I agree with you:

                • Sleep/reachability/etc. tagging from timestamps is trivial. Your journalctl example is perfect.
                • A lot of it is the advertised product (search “Duane”, Focus/Sleep).
                • The “applies to any personalized assistant” line is buried. Though I’d read it as a bigger problem, not a smaller one: it’s a class issue, not an Apple issue. It’s also maybe, at least my fear, where the privacy increasing momentum peaking with GDPR is being asphyxiated. People become even more transparent using AI and that data became even more valuable. Now maybe my tinfoil hat take: Look at India using their insane numbers as an experimental platform for rent to several big techs in a (parallel/‘kind of similar’ methods) competition i. e. with CCP. The problem is not enough data for training, right, so the forces against privacy increase tenfold, similar to AI intelligence increase accelerating in a way, the labs actually hide as much as possible (see Anthropic IPO redactions). Tinfoil hat off.

                Where I don’t:

                1. Outside encryption. Messages are E2EE in transit, but the graph is the already analysed result, sitting in plaintext SQLite (“stored in plaintext but located in a zone protected by TCC Full Disk Access”, states the blog article). Whoever gets into the unlocked device (malware, physical access, forensic tools, the article names iLEAPP) gets a ready-made profile instead of raw data.

                2. Your logs comparison actually shows the difference. On my Linux I can read journalctl, rotate it, vacuum it. Here the article says Apple provides “no general way to correct an inference that is wrong”, and when you delete a contact the row moves to a second table, expired_stable_graph, “and keeps its confidence and its sources. Like wtf: “Dear customer, you want to delete some meta data? No problem, we make a copy first and then delete it, but lets forget about the copy. Have a beautiful day, nothing to see here…”. How long it stays there is not clear”. So even if I, hypothetically the owner, wanted to respect someone else’s privacy, I can’t really and but even if I thought I did I get gaslighted. That’s hopefully AND hopefully not “the OS working as advertised”. Maybe it depends on who one is leaning team FBI’ish or more towards grandma~average citizen.

                3. Non-users. People who never bought Apple (like me alledgetly) get relationship labels, contact patterns and face clusters on every Apple device of everyone they ‘talk’. This is so infuriating. Your dmesg doesn’t do that by default to your contacts.

                And to the thread question (is there evidence of backdoors on iOS): the closest documented cases are Zdziarski 2014 (undocumented services like file_relay that bypassed backup encryption, Apple admitted they exist but called them diagnostics) and Operation Triangulation 2023 (undocumented hardware feature used to bypass kernel memory protection, CVE-2023-38606, intent unknown). Neither proves a deliberate door for a third party. Same for the graph: undocumented and intentional, yes. Access by someone other than the owner, not shown.

                So maybe we agree it’s not clickbait-level “Apple backdoor!”, but not just downplayed “wtf logs exist? /s” either.

                • TrollAccount69@lemmy.ml
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                  2 hours ago

                  No worries, I think you’re making a lot of really good points that need to be examined!

                  I think the graph is even farther away from the Snowden backdoor definition tweet than you say. It seems to be a room with only a front door, protected by all sorts of Byzantine security measures but not obfuscated from the authorized user (in plaintext, which I don’t 100% agree with but there are actually some good reasons to not encrypt it. In the Jersey mafioso Hitman gameplay commentary “yeah, dats not what I wooda done but you can’t argue wit results”).

                  I think history will look back on gdpr in the same way as it will (lowkey presently does) view the American ppaca: a wavebreak to disrupt people’s expression of their needs, funnel money to companies implementing it and send information to intelligence services and police.

                  As far as India goes I really try to step lightly there but that’s not really tinfoil hat territory. It never developed past being a colony, just transitioned to the subject of neocolonialism, and what is done there eventually makes its way to the anglosphere.

                  What may not be made clear in the article is that full disk access is gated by a (if I remember right) two step process that the authenticated user has to go through, so it’s not even just behind a uac popup, but a whole rigmarole the user has to put their password in to even turn on.

                  It’s one of the reasons to never give your phone or computer to cops and if they take it never to give them the passwords or passkeys and keep biometric locks disabled. Access to your social media through the logged in device user account gives the same information as the graph in the article.

                  Users not being able to take fine grained control over what metadata gets associated with them is a big deal (and a really good example of a difference between systemd logs and the graph!) but I also don’t know exactly how that would work if they could. Expectations seem to draw a picture of a radio button or slider, not a database viewing tool. Idk.

                  The delinking as opposed to deleting doesn’t alarm me at all. That’s how filesystems work, it’s how the systems operation is presented to the user in the form of the trash can or recycle bin metaphor, it’s no surprise that it gets handled the same way in a database. Heck, there was some best practices manual for sql use I read at least twenty years ago that had delinking the row as best practices for deletion in production environments. It just seems more like normal operating procedure as opposed to malice.

                  As far as people who never bought into the apple ecosystem being linked to a macos users graph: the same has been true of vCard contacts, email, all social media but specifically Facebook tagging which builds associations internally for matching tags of even unregistered nonusers, push notifications and a bunch of other stuff I’m not even thinking about. It’s one of those cows out of the barn situations except they got out around forty years ago…

                  I’m possibly more tinfoil hatted on operation triangulation than anyone else. You wanna exchange paranoid delusions about that you’re talking to the right guy.

                  Arm CPUs arent clean room designs, they’re a collection of silicon bits and bobs that are licensed from companies that design them and sell them to fabless companies. As such there are two vectors that mmio can get in: a designer leaving some way to rescue a chip that the hapless integrator didn’t properly hook up or a designer purposefully setting a backdoor with malicious intent.

                  Designers of licensable arm functions are in the same position as newmans character in the movie Jurassic park. Nobody understands what they’re doing and and if they have the guile to get an exploit past the person who buys their design and the disgruntlement to use it (or the desire for money to sell it to someone who will) then there’s nothing stopping them.

                  The licensed function ic world was never under serious scrutiny until what I’d call the middle of the smartphone lifecycle, now, and some of the industry fallout from ot has been really showing that. See apples move to emte and others dragging their feet.

                  I think it’s a hard sell to call ot an apple backdoor though, just like you, because of the crazy chain required to even be able to make a mmio request.

                  I guess I still hate that the article makes such exaggerated claims that appeal to seratonin maxing paranoiacs when sober minded consideration of risk would get more people to make better choices on a platform like macos/ios that I feel offers pretty good controls and processes to enable those choices.

            • TrollAccount69@lemmy.ml
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              3 days ago

              I’m gonna respond to your requests that I copy and paste parts of the article you linked to me and respond directly to them in a way that’s clearer later on when I have a little more time.

              But lay off the personal attacks. I haven’t said a single negative thing about you and it only makes people reading this exchange take your ideas less seriously. Which I think does them a disservice because there’s a level of ears pricked up awareness you clearly exhibit that people ought to emulate.